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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA. a Corporation,
Plain tiff-Re.sponden t.
vs.
PAUL J. HENICH. dba P. G. & H. GENERAL CONTRACTORS, ELLEN JANE
HENICH, his wife,
Defendanis,

No.
9596

MAX S. ANDREWS and NED E. SHURTLEFF, individually and as a co-partnership dba SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and
SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS. INC., a
Utah Corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought an action upon a written inden1nity agreement. The defendants signed the indemnity agreement and
pursuant thereto, a contractor's bond was issued. The contractor
became insolvent and the plaintiff was required to pay creditors
of the contractor by virtue of its bond. The defendants denied
liability under the jndemnity agreement.
l
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury, the
Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr., presiding. The trial court found
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and granted
judgment thereon. Defendants Max Andrews and Ned E.
Shurtleff individually and doing business as Shurtleff & Andrews
Construction Company, a partnership, and Shurtleff & Andrews,
Inc., appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appealing defendants seek reversal of the judgment
or a new trial. The plaintiff seeks affirmance of its judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is an insurance company doing business in
the State of Utah. Part of its business consists of writing bonds
for construction contractors through its local agents. Dale
Barton is an insurance agent doing business as the Dale Barton
Agency. Dale Barton represents the plaintiff and other companies in writing bonds (TR. 65 & 66). Prior to December,
1959~ the Dale Barton Agency had written several bonds for
Paul J. Henich, dba P. G. & H. General Contractors, on various
construction jobs (TR. 217-219). The bonds were written
through the plaintiff company. In 1958, the Dale Barton
Agency had Henich and his wife execute a general application
and agreement of indemnity for contract bonds with the plaintiff
company. The agreement provided that Henich and his wife
'Nould indemnify the plaintiff company for any and all losses
2
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suffered on bonds previously written or to be written in the
future for Henich. (Ex. No. 1). In December of 1959, Henich
contacted Barton at his agency and received a Bid Bond on a
project known as the St. Joseph Convent job in Ogden, Utah,
and stated that if he was successful on the bid he would be
required to furnish a payment and performance bond (TR. 72).
On December 23, 1959, the contract was awarded to Henich
with the requirement of a bond in the sum of $140,000.00
(TR. 219). When Henich was notified that he was the successful bidder, he brought the contract to the Barton agency where
a bond was written in the sum of 50lf0 of the contract figure
(TR. 72). No indemnity was required on the bond other than
the aforementioned general indemnity agreement given to the
plaintiff by Henich and his wife. The 50lfo bond provided
by Barton was not acceptable to the architect on the convent
project and in January a new bond was executed by Barton
for the full amount of the contract, or $140,000.00. The
second bond written on the convent project was pre-dated to
December 23, 1959, to conform to the date shown on the
contract, although the same was not executed and delivered
until January of 1960 (TR. 72-73, Ex. No. 13).
During December, 1959, and the first part of January, 1960,
Henich was negotiating with the Pacific Intermountain Express
Company for a contract to build their terminal building to be
located in Salt Lake City, ·utah (TR. 161-162). On the 18th
or 19th of January, 1960, Henich talked to Dale Barton
concerning a bond on this project if he was successful in negotiating a contract ( TR. 164-167, 169) . At this time, the
estimated cost of the project was approximately $275,000.00,
but had not been ascertained with certainty (TR. 160-161).

3
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Sometime during the week of January 25 to January 30, 1960,
I-Ienich came to the Dale Barton Agency and informed Barton
that he had been awarded the contract on the PIE job and
asked Barton if he could furnish him with a bond to cover
this contract (TR. 74, 75). At this time, Barton informed
Henich that his financial position was not such that additional
bond credit could be given to him (TR. 76). It was also pointed
out to him that since the Convent project had just commenced,
he would have a work load in excess of $400,000.00 in operation at one time and that in Barton's opinion he was not of
such financial stability to assure performance of both projects
at the same time (TR. 75-89) . At this time Barton refused
Henich's request for a bond on the PIE project. A day or two
later Henich contacted Barton again and asked Barton if he
would be interested in having Shurtleff & Andrews indemnify
him and asked if he would then write the bond (TR 76, 77).
Barton suggested to Henich that a financial statement of
Shurtleff & Andrews be presented for examination and the
matter would be taken under consideration. A financial statement by Dun & Bradstreet on Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., was
given to Barton by telephone ( TR. 80) . After giving consideration to the finances of Shurtleff & Andrews, Barton
informed Henich that he still could not suggest to the plaintiff
that they write an additional bond for Henich (TR. 76-78).
Henich then asked Barton if the plaintiff company would be
interested in writing the bond on the PIE contract if Henich
could secure the indemnity of not only Shurtleff & Andrews,
Inc., but Ned Shurtleff and Max Andrews individually, as
well as the Shurtleff & Andrews Construction Company, a
partnership (TR. 77-78). At this time, Barton again told

4
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Henich to obtain a financial statement on the partnership and
present it for consideration and examination. Shurtleff and
Andrews then contacted their local accountant, Wood, Child,
Mann & Smith, and requested a written financial report on
the construction company so that Barton could examine the
san1e (TR. 138, 139, 144, 175). The financial report was
prepared and typed by the accounting firm on January 28,
1960, and delivered to the defendants on that date (TR 203209). The report was then brought to the office of Dale
Barton and examined by him. It was then Barton's opinion
that there was sufficient financial stability among all of the
defendants to guarantee proper performance of the two projects
and he contacted the plaintiff and received oral authority to
execute the PIE bond.
A general application for contract bonds and indemnity
agreement, exhibit No. 2, and a corporate resolution, exhibit No. 3, were then prepared in the Dale Barton Agency
by Doris Farley, secretary, who did the typing on the documents (TR 94, 179-182). She testified that exhibits 2
and 3 were fully typed by her before they left the office
and that the only part of the documents that was not
fully completed was the acknowledgment forms. Henich
then picked up exhibits 2 and 3 and left the Dale Barton
Agency (TR. 180-183). During the time Barton was examining
the financial statements of the defendants, Henich also brought
to him an unsigned copy of the proposed contract with PIE
wherein it stated that the contract price was to be $271,030.00
(TR. 116, 164, 223 and 224). With this information, Doris
Farley then typed exhibits 2 and 3 and included the Convent
project and the PIE project therein, and limited the agreements

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to these two projects and gave them to Henich (TR. 223-224).
Henich then returned with exhibits 2 and 3 signed by all of
the appellants (TR. 182-183). Doris Farley then notarized the
appellants' signatures and in her acknowledgment placed the
date of December 23, 1959, so as to conform to the date of
the St. Joseph Convent project (TR. 183-184, 187).
On or about February 1, 1960, Barton prepared the bonds,
dated the same to conform with the contract, and forwarded
them to PIE in California (TR. 79, 89 and Exhibit 4).
During July of 1960, Barton received notice fromHenich
that he was in financial difficulty on the PIE job. Barton
immediate! y notified B. E. Schalow, claims representative
for the plaintiff company, and a meeting was held in Barton's office and attended by Barton, Schalow and Henich.
At this time, Schalow suggested that the meeting adjourn
to the offices of Shurtleff & Andrews so that they could be
informed as to the developments at that time. At this point,
it was not known that Henich was also defaulting on the
Convent project. He represented that he was financially
solvent on that project and anticipated a profit. The meeting
\vas adjourned to the appellants' office, where a conversation
was had with Shurtleff concerning the losses expected on the
PIE project. Schalo\v informed Shurtleff that it was his suggestion that contact be made with the authorities at the St.
Joseph Convent to suspend payment of any further funds
to 1-Ienich in an effort to n1inimize the anticipated losses on the
PIE project. Shurtleff stated that he would have to consult
\vith Andrews, who was out of town at the time, before any
action could be taken. At no time did Shurtleff deny respon6
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sibility under the indemnity agreement for the PIE contract
at this point (TR. 11-15, 155, 156).
Short! y thereafter it was learned that Henich was also
defaulting on the Convent project and there would be no
surplus funds to apply to the PIE losses. Shurtleff and Andrews
then requested copies of exhibits 2 and 3 from the plaintiff
and after reviewing the same, sent a letter to the plaintiff
denying responsibility by virtue of exhibits 2 and 3 (Ex. No. 7).
Thereafter, the plaintiff, with approval of Henich, paid the
creditors under the PIE project and brought the present action
against the defendants (TR. 22, 23). It should be noted that
at no time have any of the defendants herein denied signing
exhibits 2 and 3. They have maintained that since the indemnity
agreement and corporate resolution are both dated December
23, 1959, and the PIE project was not awarded at that time,
that therefore they are not bound by either agreement.
Appellants further admit that the reason they signed
exhibits 2 and 3 was that they were friends of Henich and
thought Henich was an up and coming contractor, that they
had received business from him previous to this time and
expected future business from him as well as from others that
he would refer to them (TR. 137, 138).

POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE ACTION AT THE CLOSE OF RESPONDENT'S
CASE.
7
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POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT \XlAS
EXECUTED BETWEEN JANUARY 25, 1960, AND JANUARY 30, 1960.
A. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS IN WRITING AND MET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS.
B. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS NOT ALTERED UNDER THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.
POIN'f III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT COVERED THE P.I.E. BOND.
A. THERE WAS NO ALTERATION OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT.
B. THE DATE ON THE INSTRUMENTS WAS IMMATERIAL AS TO THE LIABILITY OF THE APPELLANTS AS INDEMNITORS.
C. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS NOT EXECUTED
DECEMBER 23, 1959.
POINT IV
RESPONDENT MADE NO ADMISSIONS PRECLUDING THE TRIAL COURT FROM FINDING IN ITS
FAVOR.
8
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
1~HE

COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO DIS.NliSS THE ACTION AT THE CLOSE OF RESPONDENT'S
CASE.
The indemnity agreement (Ex. 2) and the Corporate
Resolution (Ex. 3) were received in evidence after it was
admitted that the signatures on both documents were genuine
(Tr. 5, 6, 9, 10). With exhibits 2 and 3 having been received
in evidence and admittedly executed by the appellants, the
respondent had then proved a prima facie case of liability
based upon the written documents which are clear and unambiguous. Subsequent to the admission of exhibits 2 and 3,
the respondent then offered and the court received evidence
of the respondent's damages suffered as evidenced by drafts
that had been issued by the respondent to cover the various
losses under the bond. Pursuant to stipulation of the appellants,
the respondent's offer of proof on damages was received (Tr.
22-24, Ex. 8).
There was evidence that the indemnity agreement and
corporate resolution were in fact executed subsequent to the
date the instruments bear. This evidence was, however, elicited
from respondent's \Vitness by the appellants on cross-examination (Tr. 41-43). Appellants, at page 6 of their Brief, allege
that the respondent impeached its own evidence by testimony
that the indemnity agreement and corporate resolution had been
executed at a date subsequent to the date the documents bear.
It should be further noted that Mr. Schalow, upon whose
9
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testimony appellants were relying to impeach the dates on the
documents, stated at all times that he did not personally
know when the documents ·v,ere executed but was merely
testifying from reading depositions and correspondence of
other persons.
Appellants offer the cases of Davenport vs. Stratten, 149
Pac. 2d 4, Peters vs. Taylor, 251 Pac. 446, and Goldsworthy
vs. Anderson, 21 Pac. 2d 718, as authority for the rule that a
party introducing an exhibit into evidence is thereby bound
by its provisions and terms and cannot later impeach the same
(Appellants' Brief, pages 6 & 7). Respondent agrees that as
a general statement of the rule these authorities are correct.
It should be noted, however, that the cases previously mentioned say, as does the rule itself, that the party may not
contradict the terms or provisions of the instrument itself,
but in no way affects the right of a party offering an exhibit
to show its actual date of execution. In the Davenport case,
supra, an exhibit was offered showing an accounting statement
of money paid a.nd money due and the court stated that the
party offering the exhibit without qualification could not then
produce evidence to contradict or dispute the sums alleged in
the statement. There was nothing at all to show that the
exhibit had been postdated or predated. A similar situation
was presented in the Peters case, supra, wherein the court stated
at page 450:

{·I-Iow ever, this rule, like all general rules, has its
exceptions."
In the Goldsvvorthy case, supra, the plaintiff tried to shov;
that the bank \vas insolvent when he made his deposit. He
10
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introduced a bank examiner's report which in fact showed
that the bank was not insolvent at that time. He later tried to
itnpeach the contents of the report but was not permitted to
do so. All of the cases previously cited by the appellants show
a definite offer by the party introducing the document to
materially change its terms, provisions, or contents. These
cases therefore are not applicable to the present situation inasmuch as the respondent in the instant case did not and never
has atten1pted to change the terms, or provisions, or wording,
of the indemnity agreement or corporate resolution.
During respondent's case in chief, it did not offer to sho\v
that the dates on exhibits 2 and 3 were not the dates of execution as such was immaterial. 1·his information was elicited
by the appellants on cross-examination. At the time appellants'
counsel asked Schalow the dates that exhibits 2 and 3 were
executed, he knew that the documents were not signed on the
date that they bear. When Schalow answered with the only
truthful answer that could be given, that the documents were
actually executed during the last week in January, 1960,
counsel then complains that the respondent is trying to impeach
its own evidence.
The authorities are 1n agreement that parole evidence
may be received to show or prove the actual date of execution
of a written instrument or contract. In doing so, the party
offering the evidence is not altering the terms, provisions or
substance of the contract but merely showing an occurrence
of time and therefore there is no impeachment of the document.
This court has considered the problem in the case of 0 lsen
vs. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 Pac. 2d 733. In this case a building
11
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contractor entered into a written agreement with the defendant
to do some remodeling work. A contract was signed and the
work was commenced. Plaintiff was required to sue the
defendant for payment. On cross-examination of the plaintiff
it was discovered that at the time the contract was dated the
plaintiff did not have a contractor's license and therefore, by
statute, his contract was unenforceable. He then offered to
prove that the date the contract bore was not the date it was
executed, that in fact it was signed at a time subsequent to
the date when he was issued his contractor's license but backdated to conform to the date on which he began his preliminary
work on the job. The trial court refused plaintiff's offer of
proof. On appeal this court stated:
((The authorities are practically unanimous to the
effect that parole evidence is competent to establish
the true date of execution and delivery of the contract
regardless of the fact that it differs from the date shown
in the body of the contract. While the date shown in
the contact may be presumed to be the date of execution, this presumption is rebuttable and parole evidence
is acceptable for this purpose. American Jurisprudence,
Vol. 20, Evidence, page 977, states the general rule
to be as follows: 'An exception is recognized to the
parole evidence rule in the case of dates upon instrutnents. It is said that the rule that parole evidence
cannot be received to contradict a written contract does
not apply to .the date, which may be contradicted
u·henever it is material to the issues to do so, or, if
lacking, may be supplied by parole or other competent
testimony. The true date of the execution and delivery
of a contract may be shown by parole, at least where
the instrument contains no date. This is true even as
to instruments which are required by the statute to be
in writing, such as chattel mortgages.' The evidence
12
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being competent, the rematntng question is wiiether
or not the plaintiff proceeded properly to get the issue
before the court." (Italics ours).
In the case of Hewes vs. Taylor, 70 Pa. St. 387, wherein
the date of a written guarantee had been inaccurately inserted,
the court said:
"It is the agreement to guarantee the debt or default
of another which the act requires to be in writing. The
agreen1ent would be good without a date, or even if it
had an impossible date. The date is a circumstance
of identification as to time only; proof of it does not
add to, alter or change the terms of the agreement,
although it might be forgery if inserted without consent
or authority.''
The weight of authority supports the rule that parole evidence is competent to show that a written instrument bearing
one date was executed on a different day. See an annotation
on the subject at Annotated Cases 1913A, page 496, wherein
an extensive list of jurisdictions is contained with cases in
accord with this rule. See also the case of District of Columbia
vs. Camden Iron Works, U. S. Supreme Court, 181 U.S. 453,
45 Lawyer's Edition 948. In that case a contract bore a date
previous to the day of its actual execution. The plaintiff sued
on the contract and introduced parole evidence to show its
execution date. The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Fuller, stated at page 953:
ccThe next proposition of the District, that it was not
competent for plaintiff below to show by parole that
the contract \Vas finally executed and delivered by the
District at a date subsequent to the date of the contract,
is without merit . . . It is well settled, that, in such
circumstances, it may be averred and shown that a deed,
13
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bond, or other instrument was in fact made, executed,
and delivered at a date subsequent to that stated on
its face.''
See also Cowles Publishing Co. vs. Mclvlann, 167 ALR 1164,
172 Pac. 2d 235, wherein the court said:
' (Parol evidence is admissible to contradict the date
of a written instrument. Furthermore, it is always
competent to show by parol evidence that the date
inserted in a written instrument was not the date of
delivery. Such evidence does not contradict or vary
the language of the contract. As stated in 3 Jones
Commentaries On Evidence, 2d Edition Sec. 1511,
Page 2757: The general rule that antecedent and
contemporaneous oral stipulations cannot be received
to alter or vary the term of a written contract has no
application when the execution of the writing is the
subject of inquiry. It presupposes the due execution
and delivery of the writing in a way to bind both
parties to its terms.' "
Appellants, in their Brief, then go on to challenge the
respondent's right to produce evidence to contradict the certificate of acknowledgement on exhibit 2. Respondent agrees
that a certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence
of the date of execution of a document and that to vary this
date the party must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the certificate is inaccurate. This, however, may be done
by either party to the action. See Northcrest vs. Walker Bank
& Trust Company, 122 Utah 268, 248 Pac. 2d 692, wherein
this court stated at page 273 as follows:
''Many authorities hold that where a party did not
in fact appear before the notary, nor otherwise ackno,vledge the deed before him that the notary may testify
14
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to such facts in impeachment of his certificate. 1 CJS,
Acknowledgments, Section 139, Page 900; Peoples
Gas Company vs. Fletcher, 81 Kansas 76, 105 Pac. 24,
·i LRA, NS, 1170 and 1171. 1 Am. Jur. 380, Acknowledgments~ Section 154, states:
The trend of authority, however, is in favor
of ad1nitting any evidence that may haz:e a tendency
to proz;e the truth, and a more liberal rule permits the
officer to be called as a witness and compelled under
oath to state the true facts of the transaction so far
as he can remember them, whether he acted under
mistake, misapprehension, or in collusion with the
party to be benefited by taking the acknowledgment ... "
(Italics ours) .
rr •••

The court then went on to say:
((Wigmore in his work on evidence, Vol. 2 3rd
Edition, Section 530, in discussing this problem concludes that there is really no basis for excluding the
notary's testimony merely because it contradicts his
previous certificate. He says:
The notion has no
better grounds for support here than elsewhere. If
the certificate is not absolutely conclusive and may be
other,vise shown to be incorrect, then the official should
be equally competent. The official doubtless should be
punished, but not the party needing his testimony. The
official is clearly capable of falsification, but the value
of his testimony should be left to the jury.' "
t

•

•

•

The court then said:
"We are in accord with the foregoing rule as better
serving the purpose of getting at the truth and doing
justice between the parties."
The appellants at page 7 of their Brief, say the cases also
reason that the party for whose benefit the notarization has
been executed cannot cause the certification to be impeached,
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and offer in support thereof, Gatewood vs. Roquemore, 118
Pac. 2d 1020. This case does not in any respect deny the right
of either party to impeach an acknowledgment. The court
merely stated at page 1021:
((The uncorroborated testimony of the grantor is not
sufficient if the surrounding facts are as consistent
vrith the truth of the certificate as they are with the
denial of the grantor."
Any party to an action may impeach the certificate of
acknowledgment in an effort to get to the truth of the matter.
Appellants, in their Brief, constantly refer to the notary
public as an employee of the respondent. This is not so. The
testitnony clearly shows that Doris Farley was an employee
of the Dale Barton Insurance Agency and had no connection
with the plaintiff (Tr. 84).
The allegation in respondent's complaint, stating that
on or about December 23, 1959, an indemnity agreement was
executed, (Ex. 2) is of no material bearing on the validity of
the agreement.
The appellants were not in any way surprised or misled
to their detriment by the pleadings. The evidence is clear that
this matter was amply clarified by answers to interrogatories
propounded by appellants as well as the issues set forth in the
pretrial order (R. 42, 51 and Tr. 6). It should be further
pointed out that when the complaint was filed it was based
upon a written indemnity agreement contained in respondent's
files in Denver, Colorado. As soon as the correct information
vras received by respondent as to the actual time of execution,
it \vas re1ayed to appellants pursuant to their interrogatories.
16
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Respondent respectfully submits that exhibits 2 and 3
are clear and unambiguous, are in writing, and admittedly
signed by the appellants. The genuineness of the exhibits was
conceded by appellants' counsel (Tr. 5). Respondent had
sustained its burden of proof. This was ably pointed out to
counsel for the appellants by the trial judge (Tr. 246).
At page 8 of appellants' Brief, they point to the fact
that Schalo\v testified that the Convent bond was not executed
until February of 1960. This statement is taken out of context
from his testitnony and had counsel desired to be accurate,
he would have also shown in his statement that the bond
referred to by Mr. Schalow at this point was a bond issued
to correct the original bond that was given in an improper
amount of money (Tr. 54, 55). Respondent respectfully
submits that even the appellants admit in their Brief at pages
8 and 9 that Mr. Schalow, respondent's exclusive witness on
its case in chief, testified that he did not know personall}
when the indemnity agreement (Ex. 2) was signed. This
certainly could not in any way be a contradiction when a witness
is asked if he knows a particular fact and he admits that he
personally does not know of this fact.
Appellants have devoted considerable space in their Brief
to a discussion of the bond issued on the Convent job. It should
respectfully be brought to the court's attention that there is
no dispute as to the applicability of the general indemnity
agreement (Ex. 2) to that bond, and appellants have admitted
liability for any losses under that bond. It therefore becomes
unnecessary to further discuss additional testimony on this
point.
17
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The respondent offered, and the court properly received,
exhibits 2 and 3 which established a prima facie case on behalf
of the respondent. Appellants then had the burden of going
forward to refute the documents. The documents were complete, unambiguous and admittedly signed by the appellants.
lJpon this basis, the court correctly ruled that the documents
speak for themselves.

POINT II
Tl-IE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS
EXECUTED BETWEEN JANUARY 25, 1960, AND JANUARY 30, 1960.
A. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS IN WRITING AND MET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS.
B. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS NOTALTERED UNDER THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.
Respondent shall consider together the foregoing points
raised separately by appellants so as to avoid needless repetition.
Respondent has no quarrel with the authorities cited by
the appellants concerning the proposition that an indemnity
agreement promising to answer for the debt or default or miscarriage of another must be in writing. Exhibits 2 and 3 are
in writing, are signed by the appellants pursuant to their own
admission, and are clear and unambiguous in their terms. Respondent fails to see the necessity of citing further authorities
on these propositions as \\ras done by appellants. Exception
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is taken to the statements appearing on page 12 of appellants'
Brief '"herein they state:
"The evidence is uncontroverted that the contract
amount of $271,030.00 for the PIE job was not determined by either the contractor, Henich, or the plaintiff through its representative, Dale Barton, until sometime after January 28, 1960." (Italics ours).
The record clearly shows that the contract with the amount
specified therein was delivered in Salt Lake City on January 28,
1960, and at which time copies were immediately given to
Henich, who on the same day delivered an unsigned copy to
the Dale Barton Agency for the preparation of exhibits 2
and 3 (Tr. 116, 164, 223, 224).
Appellants also state at page 12 of their Brief that neither
of the appellants, Andrews and Shurtleff, knew anything about
the PIE job until July, 1960. This simply is not true, as evidenced by testimony of the appellants. Andrews, when asked
by the trial judge in regard to this matter, stated that he knew
of the job prior to this time and that he, as well as all of the
defendants, had worked on the PIE job (Tr. 131). The
evidence clearly shows that the appellants had furnished their
equipment and services to Henich on the PIE job.
In reviewing the case of Grand Junction Gospel Tabernacle vs. Arvis, 15 7 Pac. 2d 619, as cited by appellants at
page 15 of their Brief, the facts readily disclose that the rule
pronounced in that case has no appliction to the instant case.
In that case, a promissory note was given to the plaintiff and
was dated on its face CCOctober 28, 193 7." The terms of the
note stated that it was due 5 years from date. When the note
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became due, the plaintiff brought suit to collect on the same.
The defendant alleged that because of the notation on the
back of the note stating that it was dated (COctober 28, 1938,"
that the note was not yet due and they should be permitted
by parol evidence to show this date. The Court held, at page
620:

'Change of date would change the rights of the
parties, hence parole evidence for that purpose would
be inadmissible."
c

The court went on to say that since the changing of the due
date on the face of the note was a material change of the terms
of the note on its face, the proof of date of execution would
not be permitted by either side.
This, of course, merely conforms to the general rule.
In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that a change
of date of execution by parole testimony in no way alters
or changes the terms of the indemnity agreement.
Appellants then continue to urge the proposition that
proof of the actual date of execution of the documents must
of necessity substantially modify or change the agreement by
oral testimony. The foregoing authorities cited by respondent
do not in any \vay agree with appellants' proposition and it
is not deemed necessary to burden this court with a further
recitation of authorities on this point. Argument is also put
forth that there was no evidence as to when the appellant
corporation held its Board meeting wherein it passed its resolution as evidenced by exhibit 3. The testimony of the officers
of _appellant corporation show that no corporate records 'vere
kept concerning this resolution (Tr. 142 & 143). How, then,
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does the appellant corporation expect the respondent to offer
positive proof of the time of this special meeting when the
corporation itself kept no record ?
At this point, respondent finds it incumbent to demonstrate
to this court the actual sequence of events leading up to the
execution of exhibits 2 and 3 to refute many confusing and
inconsistent statements of the appeliants in their brief. It
should also be noted that a substantial portion of the evidence
offered by the respondent to prove the actual date of execution
was derived primarily from the testimony of the parties appellant and witnesses called on their behalf. Lila Pugsley, a
witness testifying for respondent, stated that she was formerly
an employee of the accounting firm of Wood, Child, Mann &
Smith, the accountants employed by the appellants (Tr. 202203). When Andrews was asked by counsel for respondent:

"Q. And do you recall that there was some request on
behalf of your company to furnish financial data
before the indemnity agreement was signed?''
(Italics ours).
«CA. I believe so." (TR. 138).
He then testified as follows:

"Q. Did you authorize Mr. Henich to go to your accountant's office and pick up the financial statements of your companies, the partnership and
the corporation, before the signing of exhibit 2
or exhibit 3 ?"
"A. I don't know just when it was for positive, but I
remember I had authorized that information to be
given."
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sented to you in your office for signature and that
of Mr. Shurtleff, was it not?"
"A. I think it was around about that time."
"Q. And do you know whether or not Mr. Henich
went to the office of your accountant and picked
up that information?"
((A. No, I don't."
C(Q. Now, do you recall in your deposition that .
inviting your attention to page 19, Mr. Andrews,
question at line 3 . . . Question: Did it come to
your attention at that time that the Dale Barton
Insurance Agency was handling and processing
this application for Mr. Henich ?"
·
"A. Yes. I knew that Paul had brought the papers
fron1, or I assumed he had, from Dale Barton.
Mr. Dale Barton's name had been mentioned"

!(Q. And prior to that time that the application was
brought to you, was any request made from Henich
that you make available to the Dale Barton
Agency, any financial statements on your company?"
"A. Yes, sir."

"Q. And when was that done?"
C«A Well, previous to the signing of these papers."
C(Q. Did you so testify?"
((A. Yes, sir." (TR. 139).
Andre"\vs testified that he talked with Mrs. Pugsley or Mr.
Wood at the accounting office and requested the financial
infortntaion be given (Tr. 143-144).
The appellants then called Paul

J.

Henich as a witness
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on their behalf (Tr. 159 and 160). In answer to when exhibits
2 and ) were actually executed, Henich had this to say on cross
examination, beginning at page 175 of the transcript of testimony:

ceQ. Do you recall having any conversations with Mr.
Shurtleff or Mr. Andrews concerning the necessity
of that financial information before exhibit 2 was
signed?"

CCA. Yes."
CCQ. What was the first contact you had with Shurtleff
and Andrews concerning those?''
etA. \Vhen I was discussing the indemnity for the
Convent in Mr. Barton's office, he wanted a financial statement and I called on Mr. Max Andre\vs
in his office and gained permission to go back to
Wood, Child, Mann, & Smith for a copy, and
then Mr. Barton called Dunn & Bradstreet while
I was there, and the credit bureau to have a verbal
rundown.''

ttQ. And that was before exhibit 2 was ever prepared,
was it not?"

t(A. Yes."
ttQ. But you do recall the information was requested
before any signature was placed on exhibit No.
2 ?"

ttA. That's correct.'' (TR. 175-176). (Italics ours).
Rebuttal evidence was offered by respondent in the testimony of Mrs. Lila Pugsley previously mentioned above. In
contrast to appellants' contention that exhibits 2 and 3 were
signed on December 23, 1959, but after the financial statem.ent
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(Ex. 15) was received, she stated as follows at page 203 of
transcript:
nQ. .i\nd then, Mrs. Pugsley, I show you exhibit No.
15 and ask you if you can identify that exhibit?"
nA. This is a copy of the statements that were prepared by Wood, Child, Mann, & Smith for the
Shurtleff & Andrews Construction Company for
the year ended December 31, 1959."
Transcript at page 204:
nQ. Now, making reference to exhibit 15, what period
did this cover ?''
((A. This is for the year ended December 31, 1959."
;-fhen at page 205:
nQ. NO\V when was exhibit No. 15 prepared in your
office, do you know?"
((A. Well, it would have been prepared on January
28."

((Q. And do you have knowledge of from what this
exhibit was prepared, and how it was done?"
((A. We have a copy, or a draft copy from which this
is copied.''

(tQ. Now this exhibit covers the period ending when?"
((A. Dec. 31, 1959. The year ended December 31."
((Q. And were both of exhibits 15 and 14 typed in
your office ?''
(tA. Yes, sir." (Italics ours).
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Counsel for appellants then tried to shake Mrs. Pugsley's
testimony concerning the prepartaion of their financial statetnent on January 28, 1960, by asking Mrs. Pugsley as follows

(Tr. 205):

"Q. Do you have a notation in there as to when it was
delivered for typing?"

CCA. January 28. Yes, sir."

ceQ. Could that have been January 18 ?"
CCA. No, sir."
And at page 206:

<CQ. Do you have any indication when the typing commenced on exhibit 15 ?''

CCA. That is - - - that was on that day, January 28."

ceQ. What is the procedure that your office went
through in order to finally culminate in the delivery
of this document on January 28 ?"

t'A. \Y/ ell, this is prepared by the accountant who is
given the assignment and then it is given to me
for processing in the typing department.''

t<Q. Did this record indicate when these different steps
took place ?''
(tA. Only the date I received it and the date it goes out.
In that instance it went out the same day."

ceQ. And so you received it, and did you type it up?"
t•

A. I did not type it. One of our typists did that work."

Counsel for defendants then asked at page 207:

ttQ. Does your record indicate to whom it was delivered January 28 ?"
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teA. Oh, yes, it goes to the client."

ceQ. Does your record indicate that?"
teA. No, there is no indication of it going to any
specific person. That is not usually our procedure.
It is delivered to the client."

"Q. Are these delivered manually or are they mailed
out?"
"A. Well, it varies. Sometimes they are mailed and
sometimes they are delivered."

··Q. Does that indicate whether it was mailed or delivered?"
"A. It would be delivered."

"Q. And who would have delivered it?"
"A. The client would have picked it up in this case."

"Q. Does this show that?"
etA. It does not."

"Q. And this would have been on January

28 ?"

"A. Yes, sir."
Appellants' counsel then asked at page 209:

"Q. Prior to January 28, there would have been no
exhibit 15 in existence, would there?"
"A. Not for that particular year." (Italics ours).
Appellants also called their office manager, Mr. Darrel
S. Lester, to testify concerning the date of execution of exhibits
2 and 3. Counsel for respondent then cross-examined Mr.
Lester as follows, commencing at transcript, bottom of page
148:
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"Q. Has the case been discussed with you?"
"A. Yes ... well, not the case ... the remembrance of
what took place on this."

"Q. And when was that?"
··A. At the time of the depositions.''
.. Q. Before the depositions were taken?"
"A. Yes."

"Q. You didn't give any deposition in the matter, did
you?''
'CA. I did not."
c'Q. And where did this discussion take place?"
.. A. At the office."
.. Q. And who was present?"
ceA. Mr. Andrews."
ceQ. Anyone else?"

teA . N o. ''
ceQ. And what was discussed at that time?''
tcA. He asked if I would please try to remember the
incident and what took place. He asked if I could
remember changing the document. I told him . . .
yes, I could. And he asked if I could remember
when."
"Q. And then what was said by you?"
teA. I told him right at the time I could remember
making the change on the document, but I couldn't
remembef when."

"The court: But you couldn't remember what?"
.. A. But I couldn't remember the exact time."
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((The court: Do you mean the date? Or the hour?'·
((A. The date." (TR. 148-149). Italics ours).
It appears clear from the testimony of the appellants and
witnesses called on their behalf that exhibit 2 and exhibit 3 were
not executed by the appellants until after their financial statement was delivered to the Dale Barton Agency for examination.
The employee of appellants' accounting firm testified without
qualification that the financial statement prepared on Shurtleff
and Andrews Constructoin Company was not prepared or
delivered until January 28, 1960. With the admissions of the
appellants and their witness Henich that exhibits 2 and 3 had
not been executed until after the financial statement was prepared, it appears unequivocal to us, as it did to the trial
court, that exhibits 2 and 3 were signed on or after January 28,
1960.
Appellants, at page 14 of their brief, also speculate as
to what other documents may have been signed by the appellants that were supposedly complete in themselves. Respondent
respectfully points out the inconsistency of the statements of
the appellants and their own witnesses concerning exhibits 2
and 3. Some of the witnesses claim that page one of exhibit
2 was blank when it was signed by the appellants; others claim
that part of the typing was there. When Henrich was called
to testify by appellants he gave the following answers to questions propounded by counsel for respondent
r. 170, 171):

rr

((Q. Making reference to exhibits

2 and 3, have you

ever seen those documents before?"
((A. In part, I have."
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'· Q. In making reference to exhibit 2, what do you
mean 'in part you have'?''
"A. By in part, I am referring to page 3, the bottom
area where the signatures and typing is."

"Q. And what about that."
"A. Max S. Andrews and Ned Shurtleff and Paul
Henich and Max S. Andrews."

''Q. Was typing ... that typing on there when you
took it down?"
"A. That is correct."

"Q. Was there any other typing on that document?"
"A . N o, str.
. ''
"Q. How about exhibit No. 3 ?"
"A. I don't recall this one at all, sir."

"Q. You don't recall ever seeing that exhibit?"
''A . N o, str.
. ''
Then at page 176:

"Q. And I think you said in reference to exhibit No,. 2
that none of the names were typed on that document at the time it was taken to Shurtleff & Andrews, is that correct?"
"A. No, sir. No, sir, you misunderstood me."

"Q. What was it?"
"A. This is the exhibit No. 1, sir."

"Q. Excuse me. Exhibit No. 2 is right here."
"A. I said the only thing I acknowledged was on the
bottom of page three where it was typed."

"Q. Were the names typed there?"
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(CA. Yes, sir."
((Q. And the check marks for the signatures?"
(CA. Yes, sir."
««Q. Now, Mr. Henich, I would like to invite your
attention to your deposition now, on page 18. I
first asked you:
CQ. Did you sign this document down in Shurtleff
& Andrews' office?"
CA. I signed that particular document in Max Andrews' office."
My question at line 15:
t

Q. I' 11 ask you if there was any typing on page
three when you signed it?'

CA. No, sir. The only thing that was on there was
the check marks.'
CQ. Just the check marks?'
CA. Yes, sir.'
CQ. And none of the names were typed on it?'
CA. No, sir. That was completely blank when I
first signed it. The only thing there was the
checks where they were to sign, and I was to
sign.'
ceQ. Do you recall so testifying?"
ceA. If it is in the deposition, I must have said it."
ceQ. Do you know how this exhibit 3, the resolution,
got down to Shurtleff and Andrews' office?"
ceA. I must have taken it, sir."

CCQ. Was that taken at the same time as exhibit 2 ?"
ceA. It must have been."
30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·'Q. I am inviting your attention again to the deposition on page 19, commencing at the bottom of
page 18, Mr. Henich:

'Q. At that time did you have a document entitled
Copy of Resolution?'
'A. No, sir, I did not.'

'Q. You have never seen that document before?'
'A. This document?'

'Q. Yes.'
'A. No, sir, I haven't.'

'Q. And this was not taken by you down to Shurtleff & Andrews?'

'A. No, sir.'

c•Q. Did you so testify?"
"A. I still so testified, sir." (TR. 170, 178).
This witness then went on to testify that at the time exhibit
2 was delivered to Shurtleff & Andrews there was no typing
on page 1 of the document (Tr. 177-178). When Mr. Andrews
was asked on cross-examination if any of the typing appeared
on page 1 of exhibit 2 he stated that the exhibit was blank
on page 1 when he signed it (Tr. 141). In contrast, appellants' office manager, Lester, who was present when the
exhibits were executed and who admittedly changed the name
of one of the corporate officers on exhibits 2 and 3 to correct
the same, was asked if there was any typing other than printing on page 1 of exhibit 2, and he answered as follows (Tr.
147):

"Q. When you saw these documents, what was prepared on them . . . making reference to exhibit
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2, insofar as the typing on the exhibit was con-

cerned?"
etA. I don't know."

''Q. Do you know whether or not there was any typing
on page 1 ?"
''A. I know it wasn't blank, yes. I don't know what was
there. There was something on these, yes."

''The court: Which exhibit is he referring to?"

''Q. Exhibit 2. Do you recall the names on there being
typed .I"
''A . y es. ,,

''Q. They were there?''
"A. Yes." (Italics ours).
The evidence also shows that Henich denied delivering
exhibit 3 to the appellants for signature but their testimony
indicates that they received it from Henich at the same time
they signed exhibit 2 (Tr. 122, 150, 151 and 177).
Respondent respectfully submits that the testimony of the
appellants, their witnesses, and the independent testimony
of their accountants' former employee, shows conclusively that
exhibits 2 and 3 had been typed, and were then signed by the
appellants during the week of January 25 through January
30, 1960. The trial court so found based upon clear and convincing evidence.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
INDE~1NITY AGREEMENT COVERED THE P.I.E. BOND.
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A. THERE WAS NO ALTERATION OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT.
B. THE DATE ON THE INSTRUMENTS WAS IMMA'"fERIAL AS TO THE LIABILITY OF THE APPELLANTS AS INDEMNITORS.
Appellants offered no testimony upon which the court
could base a finding that exhibits 2 and 3 had been altered
after they had been signed by the appellants. The trial court
found that the two exhibits evidenced no indication of erasures
·whatsoever. There was no indication of placing additional
typewritten matter on the documents after they had been originally typed and the documents contained a full description
of the bonds to be indemnified. The court further pointed out
to counsel for the appellants that even the appellants and
t9eir witnesses contradicted themselves as to what the documents contained when they signed them (Tr. 248-249). The
trial court found the evidence to be clear and convincing in
respondent's favor. This court said in the case of Northcrest,
Inc. vs. Walker Bank & Trust Company, supra:
C(His findings should not be disturbed unless we must
say that no one could reasonably find the evidence to
be clear and convincing.''
See also Child vs. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 Pac. 2d 981,
wherein this court recently stated:
nit is because of such areas of uncertainty and the
fact that the workings of another human mind are
quite impossible to measure with exactness, that it is
necessary in large measure to leave the determination
of what constitutes 'clear and unconvincing' evidence
to the trial judge."
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At page 17 of the appellants' Brief, they state that Mr.
Lester corroborates the testimony of Andrews and ShurtleH
that they signed the documents on December 23, 1959. As
shown above, however, Lester's testimony was that he could
not recall when the signing of the documents took place
even though Mr. Andrews asked him to please remember. The
testimony of witness Eldredge, as cited by the appellants, is
of no material value to anyone as he did not hear any conversation between Henich and the appellants that is pertinent
to this matter (Tr. 159). Mr. Lester also testified that exhibit
2 had typing on page 1 but he could not recall exactly what
had been typed thereon. At this point, it is respectfully submitted by respondent that had exhibit 2 been signed without
any typing on page 1 as to the Convent and PIE jobs, the
appellants would have then become indemnitors for Henich
on any and all bonds that had been, or were to be written in
the future, for Henich, without regard to only these two jobs.
The language of exhibit 2 so states on page one thereof, commencing at line 29, paragraph (second." The appellants would
still be obligated, under the terms of the agreement, on the
PIE job. The limitation of indemnity specified on page 1 was
placed there by the Dale Barton Agency for the sole benefit
of the appellants prior to their signing the document so
that they would not become general indemnitors for Henich
on every job that he had undertaken or would undertake in
the future. Appellants state at page 17 of their brief:
('The agreement was only signed in connection with
and to indemnify the St. Joseph Convent job."
This, of course, is parole evidence of a self-serving nature
\vh!ch alters the terms of a written document and is in violation
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of the parole evidence rule. The appellants also agree that at
no titne did they ever discuss their liability or limitation
thereof \vith Dale Barton, anyone from the Dale Barton
Agency, or the respondent (Tr. 140-141 & 144). There was
absolutely no corroboration of any of appellants' evidence
concerning the dates on exhibit 2 or exhibit 3. As previously
shown, the appellant corporation's officers could not state
when the corporate meeting approving exhibit 3 was held as
they kept no corporate minutes of the meeting. It is maintained by the appellants that the date of execution of the
contract must be definite. The evidence shows with reasonable
certainty that the indemnity agreement and corporate resolution, exhibits 2 and 3, were signed sometime between January
25 and January 30, 1960. Respondent also submits that the
indemnity agreement and corporate resolution (exhibits 2
and 3) speak for themselves and the date they bear is not
material in and of itself. Appellants further rely on the rather
extensive testimony of Mr. Schalow, as quoted in their brief
commencing on page 19. It has been previously shown that
Mr. Schalow was an administrative employee of the respondent
and had no personal first-hand knowledge of the facts surrounding the execution of exhibits 2 and 3. However, witness
Schalow testified that it was his information exhibit 2 had
been signed after December 23, 1959, and sometime near the
end of January, 1960, to the best of his knowledge and information (Tr. 41 & 42). The testimony of Mrs. Farley, the
person who typed exhibits 2 and 3 and later acknowledged
them, \vas specific to the effect that the documents were executed
during the \veek of January 25 to January 30, 1960. As previously sho,vn, even the appellants and their witnesses indicate
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that this must be true. The documents could only have been
executed on or after January 28, 1960, as indicated by the
testimony of Mrs. Pugsley, who prepared the financial statement of the partnership, and the testimony of witness Lifferth,
who delivered the PIE contract to Henich on that date. It
would be incredible to expect Mrs. Farley to remember the
exact date of execution of the documents, based on her affixing
her notary seal, after one and a half years had elapsed.
The testimony of Lloyd S. Foote, a former employee of
the Dale Barton Agency, shows that he called the accounting
jirnz of Wood, Child, Mann & Smith by telephone and obtained
the names of the officers of Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc. This
\vas done on the day exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared and this
information was given to Mrs. Farley to prepare these documents (Tr. 196 and 197). He also stated, as shown on page
21 of appellants' brief, that he was sure the documents were
prepared at the same time the PIE contract was received in
the Dale Barton offices.
Again at page 21, counsel for appellants tries to confuse
the evidence by saying:
((Exhibit 14 had been delivered October 12, 1959,
and covered only the Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., cot·
poration up to the end of July, 1959."
This was taken from the testimony of Mrs. Pugsley to the
effect that the appellants' accounting firm had prepared a
financial statement on the corporation and delivered the same,
but she did not testify where it was delivered. Obviously, this
statetnent \vas delivered to the appellant corporation for other
purposes. There is no conflict in the evidence in regard to
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when the financial statements were delivered to the Barton
Agency. Appellants also state that Barton did not testify as
to ho\v long it was after he received the financial statements
before exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared. This, of course,
indicates nothing more than the fact that Barton did not personally type the agreements. Mrs. Farley stated that she typed
the agreements and gave them to Henich to obtain the appellants' signatures. She also stated that this was done sometime
during the week of January 25 through January 30, 1960.
This corresponds to the time in which the financial statements
were received by the Dale Barton Agency. It must be remembered that the finanical statement covering the partnership,
Shurtleff and Andrews Construction Company, covered the
period ending on December 31, 1959, and wasn't even in existence until January 28, 1960 (Tr. 209).
Counsel for the appellants, for lack of facts or legal
authorities to sustain their position, makes reckless statements
alleging contradictions in respondent's evidence and in doing
so, contradicts himself. He states at the top of page 22 in his
Brief that Barton never testified as to how long it was after
he received the financial information on the appellants before
exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared, and then accuses Mrs. Farley
of contradicting Barton's testimony by stating when she in
fact typed the documents. The testimony clearly shows that
the financial information and the PIE contract were received
before exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared and that exhibits 2
and 3 were signed sometime during the latter part of the
week, January 25-January 30, 1960. Respondent fails to see
anything contradictory about this testimony. Appellants then
go on to state that the Dun & Bradstreet report, exhibit 16,
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\vas not received by Barton until February 11, 1960. They
again attempt to cloud the issues. The testimony was very
clear that an oral Dun & Bradstreet report was received prior
to exhibit 16 and the exhibit was merely sent to the Dale
Barton Agency to confirm the oral report (Tr. 105-106 & 175).
A.ppellants again misconstrue the evidence cited in their
Brief at page 22. Mr. Foote testified that he saw the financial
statement on the appellant corporation and therefore, knowing
\vho its accountants were, made a telephone call (Tr. 197).
No where in his testimony does he state that it was from the
financial statement that he obtained the names of the parties
placed on exhibits 2 and 3.
The second paragraph on page 23 of appellants' Brief
is also a misconstruction of the facts. The testimony clearly
sho\vs that on January 28th, Henich received the PIE contract
and delivered a copy thereof to the Barton Agency (Tr. 116,
164, 223). Barton testified that when he was first contacted
by Henich concerning a bond, he told Henich he would not
\vrite the bond with only the indemnity of the appellant corporation, and it was two days after this that Henich secured
the partnership financial statement and the contract, and
brought them to Barton for consideration. It was at this time,
January 28th, that Barton had exhibits 2 and 3 prepared and
delivered to Henich for the appellants' signatures. Shurtleff
testified that he was in Gabbs, Nevada, during the week in
question and stated that he had parfied with three persons
on the night of January 27, 1960, at a party given by an
engineering company. He also gave the names of those persons
but never called any of then1 to testify on his behalf concerning
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his presence in Nevada, nor did he give any reason for failing
to do so ( T r. 15 2) .
The rule is correctly stated in 20 Am. Jur ., Evidence, p.
L92, Sec. 187, as follows:
"It is well settled that if a party fails to produce the
testimony of an available witness on a material issue
in the cause, it may be inferred that his testimony, if
presented, would be adverse to the party who fails
to call the witness.''
The author also states at page 193, Sec. 188:
"But if an interested party tells an improbable story,
the absence of the corroborating testimony of witnesses
who, it appears, were cognizant of the facts, will weigh
heavily against him."
Appellants introduced into evidence exhibit 19, which
is a group of alleged receipts given to Shurtleff while on this
purported trip to Nevada. It is respectfully pointed out that
the receipts clearly show they were written by this witness
personally and a.re not worthy of belief (Tr. 156). It should
be noted that the signature appearing on the purported
expense account submitted by Mr. Shurtleff is also the very
same signature appearing at the top of the receipt from the
Gabbs Valley Inn as well as that on the Hotel Nevada receipt
(Ex. 19). The exhibit also shows an adding machine tape dated
Febt'uary 2, 1960, and includes a guest check from the Gabbs
Coffee Shop in the sum of $2.45 which bears the date of
Januat"y 27, 1961, a year later. The entire exhibit appears
tainted by false testimony. Mr. Shurtleff was very careful not
to place the names of any persons allegedly making these
receipts upon the receipt so that they could be verified. If
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Shurtleff had in fact made this trip to Nevada as he testified,
in view of the magnitude of this case, it seems incredible
that he didn't bring at least one live witness to Salt Lake City
to testify in his behalf. The conclusion is inescapable, he never
n1ade the trip at the time he clain1s.
Appellants continually try to shift their burden of proof
to the respondent by completely ignoring the terms of the
\vritten contract. It is respectfully submitted that the burden
was theirs and they failed in their proof. Their evidence was
neither clear nor convincing, and the trial court so found.
C. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS NOT EXECUTED
DECEMBER 23, 1959.
There is no dispute by any of the parties or witnesses that
Doris Farley notarized exhibits 2 and 3. Appellants state at
page 26 of their Brief that respondent never gave them notice
of its acceptance of the indemnity agreement they had signed.
As the indemnity agreement was a clear and unequivocal
contract to indemnify with an absolute guarantee, notice of
acceptance by the plaintiff was unnecessary. Wall vs. Eccles,
61 Utah 247, 211 Pac. 702, Brown vs. Merriott, 97 Utah 65,
89 P. 2d 478.

The testimony cited by appellants and their argument
commencing on page 25 of their Brief, and continuing through
page 28 thereof, is nothing more than a restatement of what
has already been discussed. It constitutes a series of misstatements, statements taken out of context, and assumptions not
based upon evidence. Accordingly, respondent \vill not burden
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this court with further repetition of argument pertaining thereto, as the trial court's findings are amply supported by evidence
against the appellants on those matters.
Suffice it to again say, that Mr. Lester's testimony on
cross-examination, as to the date of execution of the indemnity
agreement and corporate resolution (exhibits 2 and 3) was
to the effect that he couldn't remember the date even though
Andre\vs, his employer, asked him to please try and remember
(Tr. 149). Lester's testimony is no stronger than that given
on cross-examination. In support of that doctrine, this court's
attention is respectfully invited to the cases of Alvarado vs.
Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 Pac. 2d 986, and I vie vs. Richardson,
9 Utah 2d 5, 336 Pac. 2d 781 ( 1959).
It should also be said in conclusion on this point, that
appellants' contention on the top of page 28 in their brief that
it is uncontroverted that the indemnity agreement only applied
to the Convent job, and that plaintiff added the PIE job to the
agreement, is wholly unsupported by any evidence adduced
by them during the trial of this case. There was absolutely
no testimony during the trial of any alteration of this instrument done by respondent, and even the witnesses testifying
on behalf of appellants were in conflict as to the typewritten
portion appearing on this indemnity agreement (Exhibit 2),
at the time they executed the same. We have heretofore fully
covered this element of the case, and this appears to be another
statement by appellants' counsel calculated to mislead this
Court as to actually what occurred under the circumstances.
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POINT IV
RESPONDENT MADE NO ADMISSIONS PRECLUDING THE TRIAL COURT FROM FINDING IN ITS
FAVOR.
The answers to interrogatories served by appellants were
unequivocal as to the position to be taken by the respondent,
and the same were made a part of the pretrial order as previously
stated (R. 51 to 57). It is also perfectly clear from the record
that appellants sought to alter the provisions of exhibits 2
and 3 by parol testimony, and of course they had no evidence
in that respect. Counsel v1as aware of respondent's position at
the time of trial (Tr. 6 & 7).
In reference to their claim that respondent's proof was
a material deviation from the allegations set forth in its complaint, this is wholly without merit because the pre-trial order
clearly stated the issues to be determined by the trial court.
The evidence adduced at trial fully supports the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as entered by the trial judge,
and the cases heretofore cited are in accord with the law as
applied thereto by the trial court.

CONCLUSION
The appellants admit signing exhibits 2 and 3. They
also agree that the respondent suffered a loss by virtue of
its executing the bond on the PIE job. The testimony is clear
that exhibits 2 and 3 were typed, signed, and acknowledged
during the \veek commencing January 25, 1960. The terms
of both exhibits are clear and unambiguous. The respondent
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presented a prima facie case against the appellants and they
were unable to overcome respondent's proof. The testimony
of the appellants and their witnesses clearly shows that exhibits
2 and 3 were executed at the time and for the purpose alleged
by respondent. It is the appellants and not the respondent
who are attempting to alter the terms of the written instruments
by parol evidence. The evidence further shows that the bonds
on both the Convent job and the PIE job were dated to conform
to the date of the contracts, and that the same were not in
fact executed on the dates they bear, nor was the contract
on the PIE job executed on the date that it bears of January 25,
1960. See the testimony of witness Lifferth (Tr. 112 to 119).
This demonstrates the usual practice in business matters of
this nature requiring the bonds to be dated and effective on
the same dates as the contracts bear. Many instruments are
given a date and mailed to various places for signature and
execution. If such documents can be modified or nullified by
showing that they were not signed on the date contained
therein it would become in many instances virtually impossible
to do business. After appellants raised the issue of the date
of execution in reference to the indemnity agreement signed
by them, and the corporate resolution (Exhibits 2 and 3),
the respondent had every right to show the true date of execution of such documents, and this in no way altered the terms
or provisions thereof. The lower court found the evidence
to be clearly in favor of the respondent and so stated in its
partial summary of the evidence commencing on page 241
of the transcript. The summary contained in the Brief of
appellants is apparently designed to influence this Court's
revieVv· of this case by appealing to its sympathy and attempting
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to rest upon the virtuous conduct of appellants. It is they
who came into court with un-clean hands and their testimony
is replete with inconsistencies, coupled with evidence fabricated
to meet the exigencies of the situation. This approach was
apparent as the trial court, as indicated in part by his summation, at the conclusion of the trial, wherein he said (Tr.
248 & 249):
nTHE COURT: Now on that, Mr. Pratt, they are
not even consistent on their testimony. Mr. Andrews,
he said the contract was filled out with the exception
of the P .I.E. provision which was not in there; his
partner, Mr. Shurtleff, says it was a complete blank.
.A. . nd Mr. Henich says it was a complete blank. But
their office manager says it was not a blank but he
doesn't remember what was in it. Then they are contradicting each other, you see, in their own area so
to speak, and then, of course, as I said to Mr. Bayle,
that it was in their is confirmed by independent people,
such as Mrs. Pugsley.
Now I have seen men, and men that sometimes make
lots of money. They win big and they lose big by this
kind of conduct. They are reckless and they don't anticipate or foresee or pay attention to the ultimate
possible dire results; the very thing that you have here.
Now here this loss to them is $140,000.00 plus
these extras, attorney fees in these lawsuits, which is
a fortune. I don't know what it will do to them. It may
even bankrupt them. But they did it and they should
have anticipated if this contractor turned out to be
less than what they thought he was their loss could
have been~ of course, to the ultimate end of $270,000.00.
As it turns out it is $145,000.00 plus these other things.
And I don't just see any escape from it, myself, and,
as I say, this matter of date is not important. They
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are not in or they are not out by virtue of the change
of the date, except the opposite way for them to contradict or modify the written contract that is here.
I am satisfied that this contract was, on its face,
like it is today. There is no indication of erasures;
there is no indication of putting it again in a typewriter where they might vary the line or vary the
spacing between words. There is a bracket mark that
encompasses this full limitation. Of course that could
have been put on if it were a blank. But then what
business have men signing blank instruments. I'm not
sure that that would even avail them of anything.
They would still have to convince the tryer of facts
that they didn't intend to be bound by the P.I.E. job
and the Convent job, even if it were in blank. But they
contradict themselves on that, you see.
I just think it is one of those sad situations and it
really is. It is deplorable that men should take a loss
like this. But then, after all, they contracted to do that
and they contracted with this insurance company and
they relied on it. Otherwise, they wouldn't have issued
the bond, and I regret it. I feel sorry for them. I think
it is just pathetic that men get into situations like this.
It really kind of hurts me to see the case come out
as I think the evidence absolutely points it must.
I think if I close my eyes to the fact that they are
going to lose all of this money I would be violating
my duty here. The chips will just have to fall where they
may, but that is the way I see it."
Justice dictates that the judgment of the lower court should
be affirmed, with costs to respondent.
F. ROBERT BAYLE and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR of
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
Attorneys for Plaintiff ana
Respondent
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